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RACE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW CURRICULUM
CYNTHIA LEE1
Many law professors teach Criminal Law without any explicit acknowledgment of race and its
impact on the criminal law. That is how my Criminal Law professor taught the course when I
was in law school—and that was how I taught Criminal Law when I first started teaching.
Race, however, infuses so many aspects of the criminal justice system that to teach Criminal
Law without any acknowledgment of race reinforces the fiction that criminal law is race-neutral
and blind to racial difference—something that is just not true.
In this chapter, I briefly sketch a few places in the substantive criminal law course where law
professors can include discussion of race to enrich students’ understanding of the law.
Undoubtedly, there are other places where discussions of race could be introduced. What is
presented here is not meant to be exhaustive of all the ways in which race can be discussed in the
criminal law classroom. Nonetheless, this book chapter should be a useful guide to both law
professors who want their students to think critically about race in the context of the criminal
justice system and students who seek to make racial interventions in Criminal Law classes in
which professors take a colorblind approach.2
Jury Nullification
Many professors start their Criminal Law course with a discussion of theories of punishment and
basic principles of criminal law, including the requirement that the prosecution prove its case
beyond a reasonable doubt. Some professors also include the concept of jury nullification when
discussing basic principles of criminal law.
If one covers the concept of jury nullification, one might want to have students engage Professor
Paul Butler’s proposal calling for racially based jury nullification. Butler argues that African
American jurors should engage in jury nullification in cases involving African Americans
charged with non-violent crimes.3
To make his case, Butler notes that “one-third of African-American young men are under
criminal justice supervision[,] . . . over half of the women in state prison are African-American,
and over half of the men in federal and state prisons are African-American.”4 Butler points out
that their numbers in prison suggest African Americans—who constituted only 12 percent of the
1
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total population at the time—are the most dangerous and most immoral people in the United
States5 when, in fact, many African Americans are in prison for non-violent drug offenses.6
Butler notes that a huge cost of having one out of every three young African American males
under criminal justice supervision is a “lack of male role models and male income” and “a lack
of marriage-eligible” men in the African American community.7 To combat this problem, Butler
urges African American jurors to consider nullifying or voting to acquit in cases involving
African American defendants charged with non-violent drug offenses.8
One does not have to agree with Butler’s racial jury nullification proposal to recognize its value
as a pedagogical tool to encourage critical thinking about race and the criminal justice system. If
one assigns Butler’s work, one can also assign Andrew Leipold’s strong rebuttal to Butler’s
proposal so students can consider the arguments on both sides of the question.9
Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine
Many professors teach the void-for-vagueness doctrine in Criminal Law. Under this doctrine, a
statute that either fails to give ordinary citizens fair notice of what conduct is criminal or gives
law enforcement officers arbitrary and capricious discretion to arrest individuals violates due
process.10 A number of United States Supreme Court cases expound on this doctrine and allow a
discussion of the ways in which implicit racial bias can influence a police officer’s decision to
arrest.
For example, in Kolender v. Lawson, the Court struck down a California statute that required
persons loitering or wandering on the streets to (1) present credible and reliable identification,
and (2) account for their presence, when requested by a police officer under circumstances that
would justify a Terry stop.11 The individual at the center of this case, Ed Lawson, was an African
American male with dreadlocks who had been stopped over fifteen times prior to the arrest that
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led him to challenge the constitutionality of the California loitering statute.12 Suspecting that the
main reason he was stopped so often by the police was his race, Lawson challenged the
constitutionality of the California statute.13 He argued that it gave officers too much discretion,
and the Supreme Court agreed. Writing for the Court, Justice O’Connor explained why the
statute was unconstitutional:
Section 647(e), as presently drafted and as construed by the state courts, contains
no standard for determining what a suspect has to do in order to satisfy the
requirement to provide a ‘credible and reliable’ identification. As such, the statute
vests virtually complete discretion in the hands of the police to determine whether
the suspect has satisfied the statute . . . We conclude § 647(e) is unconstitutionally
vague on its face because it encourages arbitrary enforcement by failing to
describe with sufficient particularity what a suspect must do in order to satisfy the
statute.14
Justice O’Connor did not address the role that implicit racial bias may have had in Lawson’s
being stopped in the first place. Her analysis in the case was thus consistent with her overall
color-blind jurisprudence.15 A professor interested in calling attention to race, however, could
use Kolender v. Lawson to highlight the racial implications of vague loitering laws by
highlighting the way in which implicit racial bias can encourage people in general to associate
African Americans with crime and police officers in particular to stop Black individuals more
often than individuals who are not Black.16
L. Song Richardson’s article, Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, helps
students understand this point. Using the science of social cognition, Richardson explains why a
well-meaning officer might perceive the behavior of a Black person as suspicious even though
the officer would not regard the same behavior by a White person as suspicious:
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The science of implicit social cognition demonstrates that individuals of all races
have implicit biases in the form of stereotypes and prejudices that can negatively
and nonconsciously affect behavior towards blacks. The implicit stereotype
consists of the cultural stereotype of blacks, especially young men, as violent,
hostile, aggressive, and dangerous. In the policing context, implicit stereotypes can
cause an officer who harbors no conscious racial animosity and who rejects using
race as a proxy for criminality to unintentionally treat individuals differently based
solely upon their physical appearance.
As a result of implicit biases, an officer might evaluate behaviors engaged in by
individuals who appear black as suspicious even as identical behavior by those who
appear white would go unnoticed. In other words, even when officers are not
intentionally engaged in conscious racial profiling, implicit biases can lead to a
lower threshold for finding identical behavior suspicious when engaged in by
blacks than by whites.17
Paul Butler’s essay, Walking While Black: Encounters with the Police on My Street, makes a
similar point through first person narrative. In this essay, Butler, an African American male law
professor, recounts the night that he was stopped, questioned, and followed by D.C. police
officers while he was walking home.18 Students often tell me that Butler’s Walking While Black
was the most memorable and impactful article they read during the semester.
Another case that illustrates the role of implicit racial bias in the exercise of police discretion is
the 2009 arrest of African American Harvard professor Henry Louis Gates. In Masculinities,
Post-Racialism, and the Gates Controversy: The False Equivalence Between Officer and
Civilian, Frank Rudy Cooper illustrates the discretion inherent in the Massachusetts disorderly
conduct statute upon which a White police officer relied to arrest Dr. Gates in Dr. Gates’s own
home after responding to a potential break-in call.19 Cooper goes beyond the obvious racial
implications of the case to explore the masculinity contest that took place between the officer
and Dr. Gates.
Another useful reading when covering the void-for-vagueness doctrine is Devon Carbado’s
Predatory Policing. In this article, Carbado notes how easy it is for police officers to establish
the requisite probable cause to arrest mostly poor people for violating vague crimes, such as
loitering, sleeping in a public place, sitting or lying down in a particular public place, camping or
lodging in a public place, panhandling, storing personal property in a public place without a
permit, drinking in public, and removing trash from a bin.20 This power to arrest—and
concurrent power to engage in social control—sets into motion a chain of events that Carbado
argues leads to mass criminalization of mostly poor Black and brown individuals.
Hate Crimes and the Actus Reus Requirement
17
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When Criminal Law professors teach the actus reus requirement, most focus on the voluntary act
requirement,21 the unconsciousness defense,22 omission liability,23 and the prohibition on status
crimes.24 In addition, some professors cover the criminal law principle that, as a general matter,
one cannot be held criminally liable for bad thoughts alone.25 Students studying this principle
often wonder why it is that a state can punish an individuals for a hate crime, which they might
see as punishing a person for their hateful thoughts. A professor can address the distinction
between thoughts and acts by assigning Wisconsin v. Mitchell, the seminal case on hate crimes.
In this case, the Supreme Court explains that hate crimes are permissible because they punish a
person for actions motivated by bias, not for hateful thoughts alone.26
Voluntary Manslaughter and the Defense of Provocation
Most Criminal Law professors cover the defense of provocation, also known as the heat of
passion defense. A defendant charged with murder who argues that he was provoked into a
passion, can ask the jury to find him guilty, not of murder, but of a lesser offense, like voluntary
manslaughter, because he killed while in a heat of passion. One arguing provocation must show
he was spurred to action by legally adequate provocation.
At early common law, legally adequate provocation existed only if the defendant was provoked
by certain things, including an aggravated assault or battery, mutual combat, an illegal arrest, the
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As a general matter, to be held criminally liable, one must engage in a voluntary act that causes social harm. See
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observation of the commission of a serious crime against a close relative of the defendant, or
observation of one’s spouse in the act of adultery.27
Virtually every single jurisdiction in the United States has abandoned the early common law
approach to provocation, replacing it with a reasonable person test. Under this test, the defendant
must show that a reasonable person in his shoes would have been provoked into a heat of
passion. Legally adequate provocation is no longer confined to the five categories that were
recognized at early common law but is defined in reference to the hypothetical reasonable
person.
One categorical rule from the early common law approach, however, has persisted. Under the
mere words rule, mere words can never constitute legally adequate provocation. This is because
the law presumes that a defendant who kills in response to mere words is not reacting the way a
reasonable person would react.
One could simply tell students about the mere words rule and move on, but the mere words rule
has an interesting history. It turns out that the rule is not as absolute as it seems at first glance.
Courts have consistently allowed male murder defendants to argue provocation in cases where
the only thing that provoked them were mere words by their wives admitting to the commission
of adultery or suggesting the husband’s sexual inadequacy.28
In light of this gendered history allowing male defendants to argue provocation even when the
provocation came from mere words, one avenue for fruitful discussion regarding race is the
question of whether African American defendants charged with murder should be permitted to
argue provocation if what provoked them was being called the N-word. Camille Nelson has
argued that Black defendants who have suffered years of racial discrimination and racially
derogatory insults should be allowed to argue they were reasonably provoked into a heat of
passion after being called the N-word.29 One can ask one’s students whether they think courts
should permit African American defendants charged with murdering someone who called them
the N-word to argue provocation, just as they have done with male defendants charged with
murdering their wives, even though those defendants were provoked by mere words. It is
important to remind students that being allowed to make a provocation argument does not mean

27

JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW §31.07[B][2][a] (7th ed. 2015). It is noteworthy that only husbands
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THE REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND FEAR IN THE CRIMINAL COURTROOM 22 (NYU Press 2003) (discussing a Texas case in
which the Court of Appeals refused to apply a Texas statute that made homicide justifiable when a husband killed
a man upon finding that man in the act of adultery with the husband’s wife to a woman who was charged with
murder for shooting and killing her husband’s mistress after catching them in the act of adultery).
28
See People v. Berry, 556 P.2d 777 (Cal. 1976) (finding that a defendant who strangled his wife to death after she
“sexually arous[ed] him and taunt[ed] him into jealous rages” was entitled to a provocation instruction on
voluntary manslaughter); People v. Ambro, 505 N.E.2d 381 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987), overruled by People v. Chevalier,
544 N.E.2d 942 (Ill. 1989) (finding that a defendant who stabbed his wife to death after “she informed him of her
adultery and then goaded him to kill her” was entitled to a provocation instruction on voluntary manslaughter).
29
Camille A. Nelson, (En)raged or (En)gaged: The Implications of Racial Context to the Canadian Provocation
Defense, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 1007, 1053 (2002).
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one will succeed in convincing the jury that one was reasonably provoked. It simply provides the
opportunity to make the argument.
Involuntary Manslaughter
Many criminal law casebooks include State v. Williams.30 In this case, a Native American couple
was charged with and convicted of manslaughter in the death of their infant child. According to
the trial court’s findings of facts, the parents had known that their seventeen-month-old child was
ill but did not realize how sick he was. They simply thought he had a toothache and gave him
some aspirin, thinking that would help. They did not take the baby to a doctor because they
feared that the Welfare Department would take him away from them.
At the time this case was decided, the state of Washington allowed a manslaughter conviction on
a showing of simple or ordinary negligence.31 The Williams case thus allows for a rich discussion
of whether the young Native American parents (the husband was a twenty-four year old laborer
with a 6th grade education and his wife was just twenty years old with an 11th grade education)
acted reasonably in failing to take the child to the doctor. In a Note following this case in our
Criminal Law casebook, Angela Harris and I invite the reader to consider whether, when trying
to decide whether a defendant’s actions conformed to those of a reasonable person, the jury
should consider race, ethnicity, class, age, gender, or level of education.32
To encourage the students to think about the situation from the perspective of a Native American
parent, we include an excerpt from the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, which reveals that
around the time the Williams case was decided, approximately 25 to 35 percent of all Native
American children were separated from their families and placed in foster homes, adoptive
homes, or institutions.33 The Act specifically notes that “[i]n the state of Washington, the Indian
adoption rate is 19 times greater and the foster care rate 10 times greater [than the non-Indian
rate].”34
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State v. Williams, 484 P.2d 1167 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971).
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2011, 12:01 PM), https://www.npr.org/2011/10/25/141672992/native-foster-care-lost-children-shattered-families
[https://perma.cc/CH9V-3B86] (discussing the fact that 32 states are not in compliance with the Indian Child
Welfare Act of 1978’s directive that Native American children must be placed with their relatives or tribes except
in the rarest of circumstances, and that states must do everything it can to keep native families together).
31
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We also include a Note referencing the work of Jennifer Collins who conducted a study of fatal
neglect cases brought against parents or guardians.35 Collins found that class seemed to affect
which parents ended up being prosecuted, with preferential treatment being given to middle and
upper class parents over parents who were unemployed or in blue collar positions.36
Rape
Another area where one can call attention to race is the law of rape. When I teach rape, I usually
start by informing my students that, as a historical matter, Black men who engaged in sexual
intercourse with White women were often charged with and convicted of rape.37 This was in part
due to social norms that made it taboo for White women to socialize with Black men. It was also
partially due to deeply entrenched racial stereotypes about Black men as sexual predators.38
Indeed, before the Supreme Court ruled in Coker v. Georgia that imposing the death penalty for
the crime of rape violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishments, Black men convicted of raping White women received the death penalty more
often than White men convicted of raping White women, Black men convicted of raping Black
women, and White men convicted of raping Black women.39
In addition to our long history of seeing Black men as sexual predators, our country also has a
long history of disbelieving Black women when they have been raped, stemming from
stereotypes about Black women as being overly promiscuous.40 Indeed, these kinds of
stereotypes likely contributed to the ability of White slave masters and their sons to rape their
Black female slaves with impunity.41 Highlighting this history provides important historical
context for law students studying the law of rape.

35
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The Doctrine of Self-Defense
Another area where one can incorporate race into the criminal law curriculum is the doctrine of
self-defense. Most criminal law casebooks include the case of Bernhard Goetz, a White man who
was charged with attempted murder, assault, reckless endangerment, and unlawful possession of
a firearm after shooting four Black youths on a subway after two of them approached and asked
him for five dollars.42 Goetz later confessed to the police that his intent was to murder the
youths. Despite strong evidence against him, Goetz was acquitted of all the charges except an
unlawful possession of a firearm charge.
One can use the Goetz case to discuss how attorneys can covertly play on racial stereotypes.
According to George Fletcher, who observed the trial, Goetz’s attorneys referred to the African
American male victims as “savages,” “predators,” and “vultures,” which were code words to
convey to the jury that the Black youths were criminals preying on innocent law-abiding citizens
like Goetz.43 Goetz’s defense attorneys also received permission from the judge to reenact the
subway shooting scene, ostensibly to show the jurors the path of the bullets. Fletcher notes that
the defense chose four large young Black men from the volunteer patrol group Guardian Angels
to play the Black youth who were shot by Goetz, suggesting that the real purpose of the
reenactment was to convey to jurors that Goetz’s fear of the four Black youth was reasonable.44
When discussing self-defense, one can also use the more contemporary case involving Trayvon
Martin, the unarmed African American teenager who was shot and killed by George Zimmerman
in 2012. Before the shooting, Zimmerman had called 911 to report what he thought was
suspicious activity. The dispatcher asked Zimmerman if he was following the suspicious person.
When Zimmerman responded affirmatively, the dispatcher told him, “Okay, we don’t need you
to do that.”45
Martin, who was unarmed, had been talking on his cell phone with his girlfriend when
Zimmerman began following him in his car. Martin ran away from Zimmerman, who got out of
his car to pursue Martin on foot. A scuffle ensued. Zimmerman claimed Martin punched him, got
him on the ground, and sat on top of him. Zimmerman told police he shot Martin because he
feared Martin was reaching for his gun and was going to kill him. Zimmerman’s gun, however,
was hidden inside the back waistband of his pants, calling into question Zimmerman’s claim of
self-defense.46 If Zimmerman was lying on the ground with Martin on top of him, as Zimmerman
that [former Senator Strom] Thurmond statutorily raped and/or sexually assaulted [Carrie] Butler,” a teenage maid
in Thurmond’s parents’ home who was likely 15 years old when Thurmond first had sexual relations with her).
42
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claims, it would have been impossible for Martin to see Zimmerman’s gun, let alone reach for it,
unless Zimmerman had taken the gun out and pointed it at Martin. At that moment, Martin would
have reasonably feared for his life and trying to grab the gun from Zimmerman would have been
a reasonable action in self-defense.
The Martin case can be used to discuss the various ways in which racial bias can influence legal
decision makers, including police officers deciding whether to arrest, prosecutors deciding
whether to charge, and jurors deciding whether to convict. More specifically, one can invite
students to consider how racial stereotypes about Black men as dangerous, violent criminals can
influence legal decision makers evaluating a defendant’s claim of self-defense.
To enhance this discussion, one can also inform one’s students about social science research over
the last several decades demonstrating that Black individuals are associated with dangerousness,
violence, and criminality. In one study, for example, participants observed two men involved in a
heated verbal altercation that ends when one man shoves the other man. When the shover was
Black and the man being shoved was White, 75 percent of the participants thought the shove was
“violent,” while only 6 percent characterized it as “playing around.”47 In contrast, when the
shover was White and the man being shoved was Black, 42 percent of the participants described
the shover’s actions as “playing around” and only 17 percent characterized the White man’s
shove as “violent.”48 The association of Black persons with danger and violence is so pervasive
that many shooter bias studies have found that individuals are quicker to “see” a weapon in the
hands of a Black person than they are to see a weapon in the hands of a White person, and that
individuals will even “see” a gun in the hands of a Black person who is holding an object that is
not a weapon.49
A professor wanting to highlight racial justice issues relating to the doctrine of self-defense
might assign an excerpt from Addie Rolnick’s Defending White Space.50 In this insightful article,
Rolnick reveals the ways in which modern self-defense law reinforces racial subordination and
helps maintain White residential segregation.51 Aya Gruber’s Race to Incarcerate: Punitive
Impulse and the Bid to Repeal Stand Your Ground is another article one might consider
assigning.52 Gruber examines the history behind passage of Florida’s stand your ground law and
the messy evidence regarding its racial impacts.
Black Rage
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When teaching Criminal Law, most professors cover the traditional criminal law defenses,
including self-defense, defense of others, imperfect self-defense, necessity, duress, insanity, the
defense of provocation, and voluntary intoxication. In addition to these traditional criminal law
defenses, a professor who wants to incorporate race into the criminal law curriculum can assign
materials on what some call the “Black Rage” defense. As Paul Harris explains in his book,
Black Rage Confronts the Law, the Black Rage defense “is not an independent, freestanding
defense.”53 Rather, the concept of Black Rage “merges racial oppression with more conventional
criminal defenses.”54
An excerpt from Harris’ book would be a good way to introduce students to the Black Rage
defense. Harris explains how this defense was used in the case of Damian Williams and Henry
Watson, two African American men charged in the beating of Reginald Denny, a White truck
driver. On April 29, 1992, protests and riots broke out in many cities following the acquittal of
four White police officers who had been caught on video brutally beating Rodney King, an
unarmed Black man who was not physically resisting or posing any threat to the officers on all of
the main charges against them.55
As Harris explains, that day, more than two thousand people had gathered to protest the acquittal
in South Central Los Angeles. There was a confrontation between police and protestors at the
intersection of Florence and Normandie Streets. After the police left, Denny happened to drive
through that intersection. Some of the protestors threw bricks at the windows of Denny’s truck,
and as Denny came to a stop, the protesters pulled Denny from his truck and beat him. A
television helicopter videotaped Damian Williams smashing a brick against Denny’s head and
Henry Watson pressing his foot on Denny’s neck as Denny lay on the ground.56
Williams and Watson were charged with attempted murder, aggravated assault, and mayhem,
among other offenses. At trial, Williams’ attorney, Edi Faal, argued that Williams was not the
person responsible for the beating. He also argued that even if the jury believed that Williams
was the perpetrator, they should find him not guilty of the two most serious offenses, attempted
murder and aggravated assault—both of which carried the possibility of a life sentence—because
Williams lacked the specific intent to kill Denny. Faal explained that in light of the acquittals in
the Rodney King case, Williams and others congregated to grieve together and express their
disappointment in the verdict, and after a confrontation with the police, Williams was so
consumed with emotion and frustration after experiencing years of discrimination as a Black
man that when he took out his frustrations on Denny, he was not acting with the kind of
reflective thought which would give rise to a specific intent to kill.57
Harris reports that “[a]t the end of Faal’s closing argument, supporters in the courtroom stood
and applauded, some even wept.”58 The jury deliberated for over two weeks. In the end, they
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found Williams not guilty of attempted murder and aggravated assault, and guilty of simple
mayhem and four misdemeanor assaults.59 Watson was also acquitted of attempted murder and
convicted of misdemeanor assault.60 The jury deadlocked on the other charges against Watson,
leading the judge to declare a mistrial on those counts.61
The Cultural Defense
Another way one can incorporate discussions of race and ethnicity into the criminal law
curriculum is by covering what is commonly called the “Cultural Defense.” There is no freestanding cultural defense, although some have argued for the establishment of such a defense.
Defendants who are immigrants and defendants of color sometimes seek to introduce evidence
about their cultural background to negate an element of the charged offense or mitigate the
possible punishment. There is no established rule regarding the admissibility of cultural evidence
in the criminal courtroom. Instead, judges have wide discretion to admit or exclude evidence
regarding the defendant’s cultural background depending on whether the judge thinks it is
relevant.
In our Criminal Law casebook, Angela Harris and I include several readings on the cultural
defense.62 We start with People v. Aphaylath, a case in which a Laotian refugee living in New
York killed his Laotian wife of one month.63 At his murder trial, the defendant argued he was
suffering from an extreme emotional disturbance because he believed that his wife preferred her
ex-boyfriend over him and she had received phone calls from this man, which the defendant
claimed brought shame upon himself and his family and triggered his loss of self-control. The
defense tried to introduce expert testimony on the stress and disorientation Laotian refugees
suffer when they come to the United States, but the trial court barred the testimony on the ground
that the expert witnesses did not know anything about the defendant or his particular background
and experiences. On appeal, the court reversed the defendant’s conviction and ordered a new
trial, finding that the exclusion of the expert testimony was erroneous since an expert witness
does not have to have personal knowledge about a defendant or the defendant’s particular
characteristics. This case can be used to start a discussion on whether a defendant’s cultural
background is a relevant consideration in a criminal case.
In Cultural Evidence and Male Violence: Are Feminist and Multiculturalist Reformers on a
Collision Course in Criminal Courts?,64 Holly Maguigan discusses the tension between two
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progressive groups, multiculturalists and feminists, over whether outsider criminal defendants—
people who are not from the dominant culture—should be allowed to present evidence about
their cultural background. Maguigan notes that multiculturalists will often argue that such
evidence should be admitted to even the scales of justice in a system that embraces the
monolithic standards of the dominant culture. On the other hand, many feminists oppose the
admission of such evidence on the ground that cultural evidence is often used to justify or excuse
the physical violence by men against women. The Maguigan excerpt is an excellent way to get
students to talk about these differing views of the wisdom of allowing evidence regarding the
defendant’s cultural background.
In (Mis)Identifying Culture: Asian Women and the “Cultural Defense,”65 Leti Volpp uses the
Dong Lu Chen case, a case in which a Chinese immigrant used cultural evidence at his murder
trial to receive a sentence of probation (as opposed to jail time), to critique the use of cultural
evidence to excuse violence by immigrant men against immigrant women. Volpp explains that
the Chen family immigrated to the United States in September 1986. Initially, Dong Lu Chen
worked as a dishwasher in Maryland while his wife, Jian Wan, and their three children lived in
New York. Chen began suspecting that Jian Wan was being unfaithful when she refused to have
sex with him during one of his visits to New York. In June 1987, Chen moved to New York. In
August of that year, he asked Jian Wan if she was seeing other men and she admitted that she
was. In September, Chen told Jian Wan he wanted to have sex with her, but she declined and told
him, “I won’t let you hold me because I have other guys who will do this.” Chen claimed that
when she said this, his head became dizzy. When Jian Wan admitted that she had been cheating
on him “for three months,” he hit her head several times with a claw hammer before passing out.
At his murder trial, Chen’s defense attorney presented an anthropologist, Burton Pasternak, to
provide evidence about Chen’s cultural background. Pasternak testified that it would not be
unusual for an ordinary Chinese man to react violently if he found out his wife was being
unfaithful. Distinguishing East Asian Chinese culture from Western American culture, Pasternak
testified that it could be expected that a Chinese man would react more violently than someone
from “our” society. Volpp notes that “the distinction [Chen’s attorney] and Pasternak draw
between ‘American,’ ‘someone from our own society,’ and ‘Chinese’ implies that ‘Chinese’ and
‘American’ are two utterly distinct categories: ‘American’ does not encompass immigrant
Chinese.”66 Volpp points out that when pressed, Pasternak “admitted he could not recall a single
instance in which a man in China killed his wife or having ever heard about such an event, yet he
suggested that this was accepted in China.”67 Volpp points out that the defense strategy rendered
Jian Wan Chen invisible. She was presented only “as a dead body and as a reputed ‘adulteress,’
bringing a ‘stain’ upon her husband.”68
There are other resources that one can assign. In Individualizing Justice Through
Multiculturalism: The Liberals’ Dilemma,69 Doriane Lambelet Coleman provides summaries of
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several additional cases in which the defendant used cultural evidence in his or her defense. She
then invites debate over how to resolve what she calls the Liberals’ Dilemma: how to balance
“the defendant’s interest in using cultural evidence that incorporates discriminatory norms and
behaviors” against “the victims’ and potential victims’ interests in obtaining protection and relief
through a non-discriminatory application of the criminal law.”70 In A Justification of the Cultural
Defense as Partial Excuse, Alison Dundes Renteln, the author of The Cultural Defense,71 offers
several arguments in favor of the establishment of an official cultural defense.72
Guerilla Guides to Law Teaching
I would be remiss if I failed to mention the Guerilla Guide to Teaching Criminal Law, written by
Jocelyn Simonson and Amna Akbar in 2016, part of the Guerilla Guides to Law Teaching
project.73
Among other things, Simonson and Akbar suggest that Criminal Law professors introduce the
concept of abolition of the carceral state as a framework through which students can “question
the core assumptions about the relationship between incarceration, retribution, and utilitarianism,
and to take seriously the scale of human devastation wrought by incarceration.”74 Simonson and
Akbar recommend that Criminal Law professors bring in “local organizers and movement folks
to talk about their work on policing and mass incarceration.”75 They suggest that professors also
“[b]ring in the voices and experiences of those directly impacted by the criminal justice system:
those arrested, prosecuted, incarcerated.”76 They urge Criminal Law professors to “[t]alk about
race, gender, and class as important dimensions of criminal justice that must be named,
understood, and debated.”77 They also suggest that Criminal Law professors “[t]ake students to
local criminal court to observe [court proceedings]” and “[s]how documentaries that provide a
larger frame for the problems with criminal justice.”78 They suggest assigning “narrative texts on
the criminal justice system,” such as Bryan Stevenson’s book, Just Mercy: A Story of Justice and
Redemption.79 They also suggest teaching misdemeanors and dedicating at least one full class to
the subject of police violence as a complement to the unit on self-defense.80
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Final Words of Advice
This chapter has suggested various ways law professors can incorporate discussions about race
into the criminal law curriculum. While it is critically important to acknowledge the role of race
in the criminal justice system and highlight the various ways racial bias can influence the
outcomes in criminal cases, it is not necessary to include discussions of race in all of the different
ways listed in this book chapter. Some professors are likely to face challenges in the classroom
because of their race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, and/or gender identity. Professors
must also try to be sensitive to their audience. If one has students who are likely to presume
one’s incompetence as a law professor or be hostile to discussions involving race, one may need
to first establish one’s authority in the classroom. In such cases, I recommend that one start by
teaching in a traditional fashion and establishing one’s authority in the classroom before
incorporating discussions about race into the classroom.

15

